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Abstract
We describe a quantum key-distribution scheme in which two nearly orthog-
onal coherent states carry the key, and the superposition of these states (cat
states) protects the communication channel from eavesdropping. Any eaves-
dropping activity can be detected from the disappearance of the interferential
fringes in the distribution of the outcome when a certain quadrature compo-
nent is measured through homodyne detection. This scheme is secure against
conclusive-measurement attack and generalized beamsplitter attack, both be-






The quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol provides a way for two remote parties
(traditionally known as Alice and Bob) to share a secure random cryptographic key by com-
municating over an open channel [1{5]. Alice and Bob publicly communicate over a quantum
channel and then exchange messages over a classical channel that can be monitored but not
tampered with by an eavesdropper (Eve). Quantum mechanical complementarity ensures
that any activities of potential eavesdroppers can be detected. Even if some eavesdropping
is found, Alice and Bob can further process the obtained key (the raw key) to extract a
safe but much shorter cryptographic key (the nal key) by using a classical method of er-
ror correction (a reconciling protocol) and private amplication [6,7]. A secure message of
equal length to the nal key can be transmitted over the classical channel by conventional
encryption methods such as the one-time pad method [8]. The security of the encrypted
communication depends directly on the security of the nal key.
Among the protocols proposed so far, the four-state scheme, usually referred to as the
BB84 protocol [2], is claimed to be provably secure under the assumption that Alice uses
a perfect single-photon source [9]. In this protocol, Alice and Bob use two conjugate bases
(say, a rectilinear basis, +, and a diagonal basis, ) for the polarization of a single photon.
In basis +, they use two orthogonal states j0+i and j1+i to encode logical \0" and \1",













Alice transmits a random sequence of these states through their quantum channel and Bob
measures each state with a basis randomly chosen from f+;g. After transmission, the
basis is revealed, which enables Bob to discard the data that Alice and Bob used a dierent
basis to encode and decode and that provide inconclusive results to Bob. The remaining
data, which is called the sifted key [10], should agree for Alice and Bob and yield conclusive
results for Bob.
The key idea of the BB84 protocol is that simultaneous measurements of non-commuting
observables for a single quanta are forbidden by quantum mechanics. For these non-
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commuting observables, the measurement of one observable made on the eigenstate of an-
other observable inevitably introduces disturbance to the state because of the back reaction
of the measurement. Since Eve has no a priori information about the randomly chosen bases
of each bit in the sifted key, she is forced to guess which observable to measure for each pho-
ton. On average, half the time Eve will guess wrong and thus introduce a disturbance into
the state. The disturbance can be detected as a bit error by comparing parts of the sifted
key.
The theoretical QKD schemes that have been proven secure against a wide class of attacks
have involved the transmission of a single quantum particle that is subject to quantum
mechanical complementarity. On the other hand, there has been growing interest among
researchers on quantum information processing using multi-photon states [11,12]. Several
authors have extended this idea and have recently proposed a QKD scheme that uses multi-
photon states as a quantum carrier [13{15]. All these authors used squeezed states, in
which the key data are encoded on continuous, conjugate observables of the eld quadrature
components. Hillery further suggested that any nonlocal eld state is useful for quantum
information processing and communication [14]. In this paper, we provide another example
that supports this suggestion by showing that the secure BB84 protocol can be constructed
by using two nearly orthogonal coherent states and the superposition of these states (cat
states).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section II reviews the BB84 protocol. The
connection between the protocol and the information exclusion principle proposed by Hall
[16] is discussed and a comprehensive explanation of the principle of the BB84 protocol
is given. Section III is devoted to the main subject of this paper. The basic idea and
the protocol of the QKD scheme using two coherent states and their superposed state are
presented, and the principle and security of this scheme are discussed. In Sec. IV, we
summarize the main results of the paper.
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II. BB84 PROTOCOL
The BB84 protocol can most clearly be understood in terms of the information exclusion
principle [16]. The information exclusion principle provides an information-theoretic descrip-
tion of quantum complementarity and imposes an upper bound on the sum of the informa-
tion gain obtained from observation of complementary observables in a quantum ensemble.
Consider two observables A and B of a quantum system with an N -dimensional Hilbert
space. They are said to be complementary if their eigenvalues are nondegenerate, and the
overlap of any two normalized eigenvectors jaji of A and jbji of B satisfy jhaijbjij = 1=
p
N ;
therefore, the eigenstates of A are equally weighted superpositions of the eigenstates of B,
and vice versa. Thus, when the system is in an eigenstate of A, all possible outcomes of
a measurement of B are equally probable; i.e., precise knowledge of the measured value of
one observable implies maximal uncertainty of the measured value of the other. In such




, and vice versa, exp(iAm) jbji =
b(j−m)modN
E
[17]. Let  be
a state of an given ensemble which is prepared with a priori probability pi in the known
state i, so  =
P
i pii. The initial entropy of the system is Hint = H() = −
P
i pi log2 pi
(in bits). Given the conditional probability P (ajji) = tr(iAj) for obtaining outcome aj
when measuring an observable A when the state is prepared in i, where Aj = jaji haj j,
we can compute the a posteriori probability Q(ijaj) for preparation i by Bayes’s theorem
as Q(ijaj) = P (aj ji)pi=qj, where qj = Pi P (aj ji)pi is the a priori probability for the
occurence of outcome aj . After the measurement, the average entropy (in bits) becomes
Hfin = H(jA) = −Pj qj PiQ(ijaj) log2Q(ijaj). The average information gain (in bits)
is I(;A)  Hini −Hfin = H()−H(jA) = −Pi pi log2 pi + Pj qj PiQ(ijaj) log2Q(ijaj)
[18,19]. Hall proved that the inequality
I (;A) + I (;B)  2 log2N = log2N (2.1)
holds for Shannon mutual information for the measurement of complementary observables A
and B on a system in arbitrary state , where  = max jhaj jbjij = 1=
p
N [16]. When N = 2,
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inequality (2.1) means that the recoverable information can never exceed the maximal von
Neumann entropy (Smax = 1) bit of the system, which depends only on the dimension { the
number of distinguishable pure states { of the Hilbert space in which the signal states lie.
Inequality (2.1) states that the information gain corresponding to the measurement of an
observable can be maximized only at the expense of the information gains corresponding to
the measurement of the complementary observable. Hall named inequality (2.1) the infor-
mation exclusion principle and showed that it is closely related to Heisenberg’s uncertainty
principle and Bohr’s complementary principle [16].
To see how the information exclusion principle relates to the BB84 protocol, let us briefly
review the optimal eavesdropping strategy within an individual-attack scheme in which each
signal carrier sent by Alice is independently subject to eavesdropping. In this strategy, Eve
lets a probe of arbitrary dimensions interact with each signal carrier independently. As a
result, each of her probes is correlated to a transmitted state and its partial information
is imprinted onto the probe. She then delays her measurement and keeps the quantum
information in her probes until she learns the bases used by Alice and Bob from their
public announcement. She nally tries to extract as much information as possible about the
transmitted states by measuring her probes. To avoid revealing herself in too straightforward
a manner by introducing dierent error rates in the dierent bases (because the error rate
should be independent of the basis if the errors are due to a random process), Eve applies
a symmetric eavesdropping strategy that treats the two bases on an equal footing. This
strategy has been shown to require a two-qubit probe { i.e., a quantum system with a
four-dimensional Hilbert space { and to be optimal by Fuchs [20]. He proved that the joint
unitary operation U acting on the Hilbert space of the carrier and probe is a state-dependent
optimal quantum-cloning process [21{23] that is given by



























 hmxjU j i jnxi = jhmxjU j i jnxij ; (2.4)








are not necessarily orthogonal to each other, but all scalar products other thanD












~ x01j ~ x10
E
 V must be zero and V must equal F −D
in order to symmetrize the strategy [24].
Let us calculate the probabilities that Bob and Eve will correctly infer the state trans-
mitted by Alice when Eve uses this eavesdropping strategy. These probabilities are charac-
terized by the conditional probability P (jji) of obtaining outcome j, given that state i was
transmitted by Alice. Suppose that Alice transmits either 0x = j0xi h0xj or 1x = j1xi h1xj.
Bob’s marginal density matrices Bix, and Eve’s, 
E
ix, after the signal-probe interaction and
without learning each other’s measurement outcomes (nonselective measurement), are easily
calculated as
B0x = EB(0x) = trEU j i h j ⊗ 0xU−1
= F0x +D1x; (2.5)
B1x = EB(1x) = trEU j i h j ⊗ 1xU−1
= D0x + F1x; (2.6)




E1x = EE(1x) = trBU j i h j ⊗ 1xU−1







 and E() is a trace-preserving, completely positive, linear map of
the density operators of Alice, and Eqs. (2.5)-(2.8) dene the unitary representation [25{27]
of the map. When Bob performs a standard measurement on the sifted key, the conditional
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probabilities of Bob’s inference of his signal j when Alice sends signal i are, for x = +;
and i; j = 0; 1,









if i = j
D = 1−V
2
if i 6= j
: (2.9)
On the other hand, Eve’s strategy is rst to distinguish between two mutually orthogonal
sets Si = fxi0; xi1g (i = 0; 1) that can be perfectly separated with a standard measurement.
She next performs a measurement that distinguishes between x00 and 
x
11 or between 
x
01 and








10 6= 0), that gives the
smallest possible error probability. This is the best she can do in terms of the information
gained from the sifted key [24]. It is well known that such a measurement is realized by











that straddles these vectors [28{32]. This measurement gives the conditional
probabilities of Eve’s inference of her signal j when Alice sends signal i as





















if i 6= j
; (2.10)
where Dopt = tr jx00 − x11j = tr jx01 − x10j =
p
1− V2 is the distance between x00 and x11
and between x01 and 
x
10 in the trace-class norm, and
bx0 and bx1 are the projection-valued
measures (PVMs) corresponding to the above detection strategy to distinguishe between E0x
and E1x. (Eve also knows when Bob has received an error) [20,32{35]. Finally, upon assuming
equal a priori probabilities p0+ = p1+ = p0 = p1, Bob’s average probability (a posteriori






PAB+ (jji) + PAB (jji)

with i = j (i 6= j) and Eve’s average probability, QEc (QEe ),
is given by 1
2

PAE+ (jji) + PAE (jji)













and Eve’s error probability, respectively. GB = QBc − QBe = V and GE = QEc − QEe = Dopt









= D2opt + V2 = 1, there is a trade-o relation between Bob’s and
Eve’s information gain.
From an information-theoretic point of view, the mutual information IAB between Alice
and Bob and IAE between Alice and Eve concerning Alice’s message is more appropriate
for evaluating Bob’s and Eve’s knowledge about the sifted key. Mutual information is the
measure of information successfully transmitted from input to output. Since Alice and Bob,
in general, cannot distinguish between errors caused by an eavesdropper and errors caused
by the environment, they have to assume that all errors are due to a potential eavesdropper.
As long as Bob’s error rate, QBe , is small, the errors can be accepted and corrected by
legitimate users. As a result, Eve can obtain some information about the transmitted data.
If the noise in the channel is such that IAB < IAE for any potential eavesdropper, then
Alice and Bob should consider the transmission channel to be unsafe. On the contrary, if
IAB > IAE, they may still be able to extract a safe but much shorter cryptographic key by
means of error correction and private amplication [6,7]. Moreover, in a classical context
there is, at least in principle, a way for Alice and Bob to exploit any positive dierence,
IAB − IAE , to create a reliably secret string of key bits that has a length of about IAB − IAE
[36{38]. It is therefore important to estimate the maximal amount of information available
to Bob and Eve for a given error rate QBe that Bob can evaluate. With equiprobable signals,
the average information gain is given by IAB = 1 − H(QBe ) and IAE = 1 − H(QEe ), where
H(q) = −q log2 q − (1 − q) log2(1 − q) is the entropy function (in bits) and is a nonlinear
function of q. The upper plot in Fig. 1 shows IAB, IAE and IAB + IAE plotted against Q
B
e ,
and the lower plot shows GB and GE. From this gure, it is clear that there is a trade-o
relation between IAB and IAE as well as a trade-o relation between G
B and GE . The sum
IAB + IAE never exceeds unity (IAB + IAE  1); that is, the sum can never exceed the
maximal amount of information that can be encoded in a two-level system. This condition
must be met for the BB84 protocol to work. Therefore, we can see that Eve’s acquired
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information IAE is bounded by 1 − IAB which Alice and Bob can easily evaluate from the
bit error rate in Bob’s data.
The last inequality, IAB+IAE  1, is closely related to the information exclusion principle.
This is because the above eavesdropping strategy can be alternatively viewed as a method
for simultaneously measuring non-commuting observables. To see this, consider the unitary
operation in Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3) with x = +, F = 1, and D = 0. This operation is called
measurement of intensity γ, where
D




~ +00j ~ +11
E
= cos γ = V. [23] When Alice
and Bob have chosen the basis +, Eve causes no disturbance and obtains information about











. Conversely, if Alice and Bob have chosen the basis , Eve learns
nothing and introduces an error with probability 1−V
2
. Bob’s and Eve’s information gains







and their information gains when Alice transmits the bits with the  basis are IAB =
1 − H(1−V
2
) and IAE = 0. Thus, this operation is clearly asymmetric with respect to the
basis used in which Eve obtains information on the bits sent with one basis at the cost of a
disturbance in the bits sent with the other basis. In this operation, Eve obtains information
only about the observable P+(= ji+i hi+j) of the + basis on the system, while Bob obtains
information about both P+ and P(= jii hij) of the  basis. Thus, when Bob observes
P, the above operation provides a method for simultaneously measuring complementary
observables, P+ and P in which the outcome for Eve gives the information IAE = I(;P+)
and that for Bob gives IAB = I(;P).
When we extend this argument to the symmetric operation associated with an optimal
eavesdropping strategy, we nd I+AB = I






because Bob’s and Eve’s information gains are independent of the basis Alice chose. We
thus nd that the symmetric operation provides a method for simultaneously measuring
two complementary observables, P+ and P, even when Bob observes P+. In this case, the
outcome for Eve gives the information IAE = I(;P) and that for Bob gives IAB = I(;P+).
When we also take into account the fact that the sifted key involves only the data for which
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Alice’s and Bob’s bases agree, the above arguments imply that Bob’s average information




fI (i;P) + I (i+;P+)g; (2.11)




(I (i;P+) + I (i+;P)) (2.12)
for the symmetric operation.
We can now see that the information exclusion principle leads to the inequality
IAB + IAE  1. Since the bases Alice and Bob used in the BB84 protocol are conju-
gate, jh0j0+ij = jh0j1+ij = jh1j0+ij = jh1j1+ij = 1=
p
2 holds, and it follows from the
information exclusion principle that the inequalities
I (i+;P+) + I (i+;P)  1 (2.13)
I (i;P+) + I (i;P)  1 (2.14)
should hold. Equations (2.11) and (2.12) and inequalities (2.13) and (2.14) imply that
IAB+IAE  1. Since the optimal strategy is the best Eve can do, the inequality IAB+IAE  1
holds for any strategy Eve may try. We therefore conclude that the bound on the sum of
Bob’s and Eve’s information IAB + IAE  1 is a direct consequence of the information
exclusion principle.
It is helpful for later discussion to point out that the information exclusion principle
is directly related to the fundamental equation between fringe visibility V and which-way
information (path distinguishability) Dopt in one-particle interferometry [39{44]. To demon-
strate this point, we note that the identities j0i h0j+ j1i h1j = j0+i h0+j+ j1+i h1+j  I,
j0i h1j+ j1i h0j  j0+i h0+j − j1+i h1+j, and j0+i h1+j+ j1+i h0+j  j0i h0j − j1i h1j
hold for a two-level system. We then nd that
Bob’s marginal density matrices B0x or 
B


















fj0i h0j+ j1i h1j −V (j0i h1j+ j1i h0j)g : (2.18)
These equations are isomorphic to the equations describing one-particle interferometry where
V gives the fringe visibility and Dopt =
p
1− V2 gives the maximal which-way information
(path distinguishability), satisfying D2 + V2  D2opt + V2 = 1 [39,40]. Note that the initial
states that Alice transmitted are given by setting V = 1 in these equations. This implies
that the noise introduced by eavesdropping reduces the coherence (the o-diagonal terms)




can also be detected by observing the fringe visibility V in some kinds of interferometry.
III. BB84 PROTOCOL USING TWO COHERENT STATES AND THEIR
SUPERPOSITION
The information exclusion principle ensures there is an upper bound on the eavesdrop-
per’s information gain and enables us to estimate this upper bound from that of the le-
gitimate user. The requirement for this principle to be valid, on the other hand, does not
mean that a single-photon state must be used as a signal carrier, but that the conjugate
bases must belong to the same Hilbert space. In other words, we must choose the conjugate
observables that operate within the same signal-state space. This requirement is satised
when the polarization space of a single photon is used to encode information. For this pur-
pose, we require a single-photon source, which has not yet been realized. To overcome this
diculty, a self-checking source, the validity of which can be self-checked, has been devised
by Mayers et al. [45,46] Alternatively, many experimental implementations of BB84 have
used weak coherent pulses (WCP), rather than single photons; in these implementations,
four equiprobable states given by
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j0wcp0 i = ji1 ji2 ; j1wcp0 i = ji1 j−i20wcp=2
E













[ji  i j−i] + O(2). Therefore, if we
consider only the rst order in  (i.e., consider only a single-photon component), the four
states would behave much like the ideal BB84 states. However, if we consider higher orders
in , the two states in one basis jiwcp0 i are no longer linear combinations of the two states
in the other basis
iwcp=2
E
, and thus do not satisfy the above requirement [53]. As a result,
this implementation is vulnerable to eavesdropping. When  is large, these states are four
non-orthogonal states lying in a four-dimensional signal state space instead of two sets of two
orthogonal states lying in the two-dimensional signal state space used in the original single-
photon implementation. There are eavesdropping strategies that make use of the linear
independence of the four states. Figure 2 illustrates the relevant subspace of the four states
in the entire Hilbert space (the Fock space). Because of the linear independence of the states,
there are non-overlapping subspaces in the four states. The states lying in this subspace
can be perfectly distinguished from each other, and a skillful eavesdropper can make use
of this flaw to obtain information about the key without detection [13{15,53]. For example,
Reid has described a strategy that makes use of this flaw, called the conclusive-measurement
attack, in which Eve can sometimes get full information by using an appropriate \positive
operator-valued measure" (POVM) [18,27,32] that conclusively distinguishes such linearly
independent states [15]. Such measurement yields no information about the state most of
the time, but it sometimes identies the state unambiguously. This is fatal in the presence
of high channel losses between Alice and Bob because Eve can recreate the state near Bob
and send it to him without loss by substituting a lossless channel whenever she is able to
measure the signal state unambiguously (otherwise she forwards nothing to Bob).
Another strategy, called the generalized beamsplitter attack, that makes use of this flaw
has been reported on by several authors [13,47,48,54]. Since the polarization and photon
number are independent observables, there is no problem in principle in selecting a few
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pulses with two or more photons and separating them into two one-photon pulses without
changing the polarization, for example, by means of quantum nondemolition measurement
[56]. If the loss in the channel between Alice and Bob is large enough, Eve can resend the
remaining photons to Bob without reducing the bit rate by substituting the lossless channel
and suppressing the signal without causing errors. As a result, Eve can obtain information
about the key seemingly without introducing errors in the transmission. Thus, a high
transmission loss together with the multi-photon components of the signal states render the
key distribution in all key-distribution schemes vulnerable, unless a strong reference pulse
is used to protect against eavesdroppers who can suppress a signal without causing errors




are linearly dependent only if we consider a single-photon component. They are
linearly independent if we consider the multi-photon components of the signal states [53].
Thus, the use of the four coherent states in Eqs. (3.1) with a large  is inappropriate for the
BB84 protocol, and Alice and Bob must use dim coherent pulses each of which, on average,
typically contain 0.1 photons.
Nevertheless, the multi-photon state can be used to implement the BB84 protocol without
this vulnerability. The basic idea of this scheme is depicted in Fig. 3. Two nearly orthogonal
coherent states ji and j−i are used to carry the key and the superposition of these states
(ji j−i)=
q
2(1 ) is used to prevent from eavesdropping, where  is the overlap of the
two coherent states ji and j−i; i.e.,  = jh0+j 0+ij = jhj − ij = e−2jj2. These states
are the \Schro¨dinger’s cat states" and are parity eigenstates that lie within the relevant
two-dimensional signal subspace spanned by fji ; j−ig in the Fock state [55,57,58]. These
four states would therefore behave much like ideal BB84 states.
In the following, we describe the protocol and explain how eavesdropping is detected.
Consider the following protocol.
1. Alice rst chooses a subset of random positions within a sequence of data being trans-
mitted.
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2. She then transmits random bits encoded with a set of nearly orthogonal states j0+i =
j−i and j1+i = ji for the chosen subset (the rst subset) which provides a secret
key.
3. She also transmits either j0i = (ji − j−i)=
q
2(1− ) or j1i = (ji +
j−i)=
q
2(1 + ) for the remaining subset (the second subset) which will be used
only to detect eavesdropping.
4. Alice also transmits a local oscillator beam (LO) with its polarization rotated so as
to be orthogonal to the signal beam on the same channel by mixing the beams on a
polarizing beamsplitter. The mixed beams are then transmitted to Bob.
5. Bob uses a polarizing beamsplitter to separate the LO from the channel. The po-
larization of the LO is rotated by =2 using a =2 plate so as to match that of the
signal. With this LO, Bob performs homodyne detection to measure the single eld-
quadrature x^ = x^a cos − p^a sin  = (1=
p
2)[eia^+e−ia^y] of the signal when he receives
it, where x^a = (1=
p
2)[a^ + a^y], p^a = (1=
p
2i)[a^ − a^y]; and  is the sum of the phase
of the signal eld and that of the LO (which is Bob’s controllable parameter). He
randomly varies  between 0 and =2 by changing the LO phase with phase shifter A.
6. After transmission, Alice publicly announces the positions of the rst and second data
subsets. Alice and Bob then discard the part of the rst subset of data for which Bob
measured p^a ( = =2) and the part of the second subset of data for which he measured
x^a ( = 0 ). Bob can obtain the sifted key from the rst subset of the remaining data.
In terms of the sifted key, the conditional probability distributions pi+(xa) of Bob’s
output x when Alice transmits signal i obey the Gaussian distributions:






− (xa − hi)2
i
; (3.2)







− (xa + hi)2
i
; (3.3)
where hi = p2 jj. The standard strategy for Bob to correctly infer the state transmitted
by Alice is to set the decision threshold at xa = 0; i.e., he sets the bit value to 0 when
he obtains xa  0 and to 1 when he obtains xa < 0. Then, his average error probability







, where Erfc[x] is the complementary error function






x exp [− 2] d [59]. This is because the two coherent states
ji and j−i are not orthogonal. Bob also checks the second subset of remaining data to
detect possible eavesdropping. Provided that Alice transmits the j1i state for the second
subset, the associated conditional probability distribution p1(pa) is








f1 + sin [2 hi pa]g : (3.4)
Therefore, when Bob builds up the probability distribution p1(pa) of getting outcome pa
upon measurement of p^a, the distribution should have interference fringes with a period of
= hi in the absence of eavesdropping [55,60].
To eavesdrop, Eve can, in principle, use a symmetric strategy by applying a joint unitary
operation similar to the one shown in Eqs. (2.2) and (2.3). It involves complex multi-photon
interaction between the single-mode eld of the signal states and the probe system, and a
physical mechanism that would enable such an operation has been unknown. Even if such
an operation is realized, we can safely conclude that our proposed scheme is as secure as the
single-photon case as far as this strategy is concerned by an argument similar to the single-
photon case. This conclusion is closely related to the fact that the quantum mechanical
superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states is cannot be noninvasively measured
[61,62], which is essentially a direct consequence of the quantum mechanical complemen-
tarity. Moreover, this scheme is secure against a conclusive-measurement attack because
the two mutually conjugate sets ji+i and jii are linearly dependent. In the rest of the
paper, we thus consider only a strategy that can only be used for cryptographic schemes
using multi-photon states, that is, a beamsplitter attack. We show that, unlike the WCP
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implementation, the intentional eavesdropping activity will be detected by the legitimate
users, and explain how the eavesdropping is detected.
We consider the following scenario. Eve uses a beam splitter (BS) to sample part of the
signal. She sends Bob the part of the signal transmitted through the BS and measures the
reflected part to gain information about the signal. What we want to know is how much
she can learn and how much she disturbs the signal state. For this purpose, it is sucient
to calculate Eve’s error rate QEe for this particular scheme. If we denote the signal mode
dened by the quantum channel as a and an auxiliary mode introduced at the BS as b, the
associated joint unitary operation of the BS on coherent state input is














1− R2 is the transmission coecient of the BS [63]. On the other hand, the
same unitary operation transforms the j1i state as


















which represents the entangled states of modes a and b even though the BS is a linear
device. Therefore, noise is inevitably introduced into the transmission of the j1i state.
The associated marginal density matrices, Bi+ and 
B





after the beamsplitter are calculated as
Bi+ = trEUBS
a













































































where ai+ = ji+ia hi+j = jia hj, a1 = j1ia h1j, VB =
DpR−pRi = e−2Rjj2,
VE =
DpT−pTi = e−2T jj2 (note that VBVE = ), and the upper sign (resp. lower
sign) corrsponds to i = 1 (resp. i = 0). Provided that Eve uses an optimum decision














Such an optimum decision strategy is, in principle, realizable [64{66].
What Alice and Bob want to do is to evaluate QEe or Eve’s average information gain
IAE = 1−H(QEe ) as a function of the disturbance observable in the signal that Bob recorded.
When we note that Eq. (3.8) is formally isomorphic to Eq. (2.16), we nd that the most
appropriate measure of the disturbance is the fringe visibility observable in the probability
distribution p1(pa). From Eq. (3.8), p1(pa) in the presence of eavesdropping can be easily
calculated as
















The fringe visibility is therefore given by VB. Figure 4 shows Eve’s average information
gain IAE = 1 − H(QEe ) calculated from Eq. (3.11) as a function of the fringe visibility
VB = e−2(1−T )jj2 by changing T as a freely controllable parameter when the average photon
number is assumed to be jj2 = 2. This gure clearly indicates that the amount of informa-
tion leaked to an eavesdropper can be estimated from the visibility of the interference fringe
in the probability distribution p1(pa) of getting outcome pa upon homodyne-detection mea-
surement of p^a. This scheme is thus secure even against the beamsplitter attack even though
the multi-photon states are used as a signal carrier. Figure 4 also plots Bob’s information
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gain IAB = 1−H(QBe ) on the sifted key under the assumption that he performed homodyne
detection and the standard decision strategy stated above. In contrast to the single-photon
implementation, where IAB = 1 for this type of asymmetric attack, Bob’s information van-
ishes in the low fringe-visibility region. This is because the intensity of the signal going to
Bob falls to zero.
Figure 4 indicates that to learn about Alice’s state with some degree of accuracy, Bob’s
visibility VB must not be too large, which implies that the reflection coecient 1 − T must
not be too small. The requirements for a large information gain and little disturbance are
thus incompatible. A large information gain requires a small transmission coecient, while
a small disturbance requires a transmission coecient close to one, and there is no overlap
in the permitted ranges. Therefore, with our QKD scheme, Eve cannot use this strategy
and diverts enough light to gain any useful information without producing a detectable
disturbance. This conrms the impossiblity of noninvasive measurement of the quantum-
mechanical superposition of macroscopically distinguishable states. The problem for Eve
is the vacuum noise from the vacant port of the BS. If she samples only a small part
of the signal, to minimize the disturbance, the noise from the vacuum state obscures the
information carried by the signal state [14].
This QKD scheme has advantages over the conventional schemes that use a single photon
or a weak coherent pulse. First, in comparison with single-photon scheme, this scheme
involves only quadrature phase measurements, which can be done more eciently than
photon counting. Second, in comparison with the WCP scheme, this scheme can use a more
intense pulse, which can improve the transmission eciency. However, the cat state is so
fragile that the loss of the single photon may easily destroy the interference fringe observed
in the probability distribution p1(pa). Moreover, the decoherence rate of the cat state
is proportional to the distance between the two distinguishable coherent states; i.e., it is
proportional to
p
1− 2  jj [55,60]. A cat state with a very large average photon number
jj2 is thus undesirable. On the other hand, there is a lower bound on the average photon
number jj2 that enebles use of the cat state to detect eavesdropping. To evaluate the
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fringe visibility, there should be at least one oscillation in the distribution p1(pa) within
the Gaussian contour exp [−p2a]. This requirement should impose the inequality pa =
=(2
p
2T jj) < 2pln 2. Thus, at least, jj > =(4p2 ln 2)  0:67 is required. In conclusion,
we think a cat state with an average photon number of the order of unity is appropriate for
our scheme. In this sense, what is needed is not a \macroscopic" quantum superposition
but a \mesoscopic" quantum superposition which should be easier to create.
In terms of current feasibility, our scheme is limited by its susceptibility to channel loss,
which is a problem because it also destroys the fringes in the distribution p1(pa). In contrast,
the channel loss is simply discarded in the WCP scheme, but this discarding also makes the
WCP scheme vulnerabe because an eavesdropper can use it while substituting a superior
channel to escape detection. It is this extreme sensitivity of the nonclassical eld state (like
the cat state) to the environment, though, that enables us to detect eavesdropping. The
current feasibility of our scheme is also limited by the diculty of preparing the cat state
with today’s technology. However, a development of a quantum gate will help us to obtain
the cat state through a swapping operation [67] between a coherent state and a more easily
created superposition state of a single quanta [57,68].
IV. CONCLUSION
We have developped a quantum key-distribution scheme that uses two nearly orthogonal
coherent states to carry the key, and the superposition of these states to protect the commu-
nication channel from eavesdropping. This scheme is secure against conclusive-measurement
attack and beamsplitter attack even in the presence of loss; these types of attack are be-
lieved to be a potential risk when a multi-photon state is used as a quantum carrier. We
expect this scheme to be as secure as the single-photon scheme and secure against any op-
timal eavesdropping strategy. The disappearance of interference fringes in the homodyne
detection used to decode the key clearly indicates eavesdropping activity, and the amount of
information leaked to an eavesdropper can be estimated from the visibility of the interference
19
fringes which is measurable from the homodyne detection.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Dominic Mayers for his helpful discussions.
20
REFERENCES
[1] S. Wiesner, Sigact News, 15, 78 (1983).
[2] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, Proc. of IEEE International Conference on Computers,
Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore, India, December 1984, pp. 175{179.
[3] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[5] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[6] C. H. Bennet, G. Brassard, C. Crepeau, and M. Maurer: Generalized privacy ampli-
cation. IEEE trans. Inf. Theo. 41, 1915 (1995).
[7] C. H. Bennet, F. Bessette, G. Brassard, L Salvail, and J. Smolin: J. Cryptology 5, 2
(1992).
[8] G. S. Vernam, J. Am. Inst. Electr. Eng. 45, 109 (1926).
[9] D. Mayers, e-print quant-ph/9802025.
[10] B. Huttner and A. K. Ekart, J. Mod. Opt. 41, 2455-2466 (1994).
[11] S. L. Braunstein and H. J. Kimble, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 869 (1998).
[12] A. Furusawa, J. L. Sorensen, S. L. Braunstein, C. A. Fuchs, H. J. Kimble, and E. S.
Polzik, Science 282, 706 (1998).
[13] T. Ralph, e-print quant-ph/9907073.
[14] M. Hillery, e-print quant-ph/9909006.
[15] M. D. Reid, e-print quant-ph/9909030.
[16] M. J. Hall, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 3307 (1995).
[17] K. Kraus, Phys. Rev. D 35, 3070 (1987).
21
[18] A. Peres, Quantum theory: concepts and methods (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1998), Chap. 9.
[19] C. M. Caves and P. D. Drummond, Rev. Mod. Phys. 66, 481 (1994).
[20] C. A. Fuchs, N. Gisin, R. B. Griths, C-S. Niu, and A. Peres, Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163
(1997).
[21] V. Buzek and M. Hillery, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1844 (1996).
[22] D. Bru, D. P. Divicenzo, A. Ekart, D. A. Fuchs, C. Macchiavello, and J. A. Smolin,
Phys. Rev. A 57, 2368 (1998).
[23] N. Gisin and B. Huttner, Phys. Lett. A 228, 13-21 (1997).
[24] J. I. Cirac and N. Gisin, Phys. Lett. A 229, 1-7 (1997).
[25] B. Schumacher, Phys. Rev. A 54, 2614 (1996).
[26] B. Schumacher and M. A. Nielsen, Phys. Rev. A 54, 2629 (1996).
[27] J. Preskill, Quantum information and computation, Lecture notes for physics 229 in
CALTEC (1998).
[28] R. S. Kennedy, Mass. Inst. Tech. Res. Lab. Electron. Quart. Prog. Rep. No. 110, 142
(1974).
[29] E. B. Davis, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory IT-24, 596 (1978).
[30] B. Huttner, A. Muller, J. D. Gautier, H. Zbinden, and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. A 54, 3783
(1996).
[31] L. B. Levitin, in Workshop on Physics and Computation: Phys. Comp ’92, edited by
D. Matzke (IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 1993).
[32] C. W. Helstrom, Quantum detection and estimation theory (Academic, New York, 1976).
[33] L. B. Levitin, in Information Complexity and Control in Quantum Physics, edited by
22
A. Blaquiere, S. Diner, and G. Lochak (Springer, Berlin, 1987), p. 15.
[34] P. Busch, e-print quant-ph/9604014.
[35] G. Jaeger and A. Shimony, Phys. Lett. A 128, 19 (1995).
[36] A. D. Wyner, Bell Syst. Tech. J. 54, 1355 (1975).
[37] I. Csiszar and J. Ko¨rner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 24, 339 (1978).
[38] U. M. Maurer, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 39, 722 (1992).
[39] B-G. Englert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77, 2154 (1996).
[40] L. Mandel, Opt. Lett. 16, 1882 (1991).
[41] S. Du¨rr, T. Nonn, and G. Rempe, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 5705 (1998).
[42] G. Jaeger, M. A. Horne, and A. Shimony, Phys. Rev. A 48, 1023 (1993).
[43] G. Jaeger, A. Shimony, and L. Vaidman, Phys. Rev. A 51, 54 (1995).
[44] W. K. Wootters and W. H. Zurek, Phys. Rev. D 19, 473 (1979).
[45] D. Mayers and Andrew Yao, in Proceedings of 39th Annual Symposium on Foundations
of Computer Science, 503 (1998), e-print quant-ph/9809039.
[46] D. Mayers, Y. Kohno, Y. Nambu, and A. Tomita, to be published in Phys. Rev. Lett.
[47] H. Yuen, Quantum Semiclass. Opt. 8, 939-949 (1996).
[48] B. Huttner, N. Imoto, N. Gisin, and T. Mor, Phys. Rev. A 51, 1863 (1995).
[49] Y. Mu, J. Seberry, and Y. Zheng, Opt. Commun. 123, 344 (1996).
[50] P. D. Townsend, J. G. Rality, and P. R. Tapster, Electron. Lett. 29, 634 (1993).
[51] P. D. Townsend, J. G. Rality, and P. R. Tapster, Electron. Lett. 29, 1291 (1993).
[52] P. D. Townsend, Electron. Lett. 30, 809 (1994).
23
[53] G. Brassard, Tal Mor, and B. C. Sanders, e-print quant-ph/9906074.
[54] H. K. Lo and H. F. Chu, Science 283, 2050 (1999); with supplementary material avail-
able at http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/984035.shl.
[55] B. Yurke and D. Stoler, Phys. Rev. Lett. 57, 13 (1986).
[56] Y. Yamamoto, in Encyclopedia of Applied Physics, vol. 15, pp. 307-337 (VCH Publishers,
1996).
[57] P. T. Cochrane, G. J. Milburn, and W. J. Munro, Phys. Rev. A 59, 2631 (1999).
[58] V. Buzek and P. L. Knight, Progress in Optics XXXIV, edited by E. Wolf (North-
Holland, Amsterdam, 1995).
[59] M. Osaki, M. Ban, and O. Hirota, Phys. Rev. A 54, 1691 (1996).
[60] D. F. Walls and G. J. Milburn, Phys. Rev. A 31, 2403 (1985).
[61] L. E. Ballentine, Phys. Rev. Lett. 59, 1493 (1987).
[62] A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett. 61, 2019 (1988).
[63] S. M. Barnett and P. M. Radmore, Methods in theoretical quantum optics (Clarendon,
Oxford, 1997).
[64] M. Sasaki and O. Hirota, Phys. Lett. A 210, 21 (1996).
[65] M. Sasaki, T. S. Usuda, O. Hirota, and A. S. Holevo, Phys. Rev. A 53, 1273 (1996).
[66] M. Sasaki and O. Hirota, Phys. Rev. A 54, 2728 (1996).
[67] Y. Aharonov and L. Vaidman, e-print quant-ph/9909072.
[68] C. C. Gerry, Phys. Rev. A 59, 4095 (1999).
24
FIGURES
FIG. 1. Upper plot: Bob's information gain IAB , Eve's information gain IAE and their sum
IAB + IAE are plotted against Bob's error probability QBe when Eve applys an optimum eaves-
dropping strategy. Lower plot: measures of information gained by Bob (GB) and by Eve (GE) are
plotted.
FIG. 2. The relevant subspace of the four weak coherent states in the entire Hilbert space (the
Fock state). The parts of the four circles that do not overlap indicate the linear independence of
the states.
FIG. 3. The basic idea of the proposed QKD scheme. Alice and Bob use two nearly orthogonal
coherent states to carry the key and the superposition of these states (cat states) to protect from
eavesdropping. Eavesdropping is detected from the disappearance of the interferential fringes in the
distribution of the outcome when a certain quadrature component is measured by the homodyne
detection.
FIG. 4. Eve's average information gain IAE = 1 −H(QEe ) as a function of the fringe visibility
B = e−2(1−T )jj
2
in the probability distribution p1(pa) recorded by Bob. The average photon
number is assumed to be jj2 = 2.
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